London Business School (LBS) Private Capital Symposium May 16, 2023 **Private Debt** 

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- Tilburg University's Institute for Private Debt (TiPD). Initiative of the department of finance and the department of accountancy of Tilburg School of Economics and Management.
- Open platform to promote research, education and networking, in the field of private debt.
- Quantitative research / Webinars / 1

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- V Research Finding IV: ESG of Private Market Funds
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### Opinion On Wall Street

# Private versus public markets is the battle to watch

Billions have gone into less liquid securities but the risks of private markets are untested

ROBIN WIGGLESWORTH ( +







### **Financial Times**

February 8, 2019

### FT Alphaville Capital markets 🗸 Added

Is the \$12tn private market the 'next shoe to drop'?

O Lord make me mark properly, but not yet




Robin Wigglesworth APRIL 14 2023

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
April 14, 2023





Source: SIFMA 2022 Capital Markets Fact Book, Preqin Pro Assets under Management breakdown, data retrieved as of March 6, 2023.






Growth of Private Capital Assets under Management, billion US\$, 2000 - 2021

This figure illustrates the growth of private capital asset classes. Assets under management (AUM) are in billion US dollars. To avoid double counting of available capital and unrealized value, fund of funds and secondaries are excluded. Natural Resources includes Natural Resources and Timberland fund types only to avoid double counting. Source: Preqin Pro as retrieved in October 2021. AUM per per year end. 2021 AUM as of March.






Private Market Growth vs. Fixed Income Outstanding & Equity Market Capitalization (2007 = 100)

> Source: SIFMA 2022 Capital Markets Fact Book, Global Equity Market Capitalization Value, Global Fixed Income Markets Outstanding Value Preqin Pro Assets under Management breakdown as per June 2022, data retrieved as of March 6, 2023. Index 100 = 2007






### On the Importance of Private Markets & Private Debt (PD), trillion US\$

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
This Figure seizes the importance of PD funds relative to other asset classes including US corporate bonds, US high-yield bonds, US leveraged loans, venture capital and the Top-500 cryptocurrencies. The data for private market assets and for venture capital are from Preqin Pro, retrieved on March 6, 2023 and per end of June 2022. Those for US corporate bonds from SIFMA (2022). The data for the US leveraged loans market including high-yield bonds and leveraged loans are from S&P Global as per June 30, 2021. Cryptocurrency data are from statista.com and retrieved on March 6, 2023, from <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/730876/cryptocurrency-maket-value/">https://www.statista.com/statistics/730876/cryptocurrency-maket-value/</a>.



**Quarterly Capital Commitments: ~ 250 billion USD** 




Bank Syndicated Lendingvs.Private Market Quarterly Volumes~ USD 75 Milliardenvs.~250 Milliarden USD



Sources: Dealogic; BIS calculations.






Quelle: Remaco Research, März 2023





Source: PitchBook | Geography: Global \*Historical AUM and forecasts generated on January 5, 2023

Overall, we expect the rapid growth seen at the end of the last decade to come down to a more sustainable pace. The year-over-year change in total AUM for PE funds ramped up to a peak of 23.4% in 2021. We expect the maturation of the industry and headwinds from a less-accommodating central bank environment to bring down growth in AUM to a level seen in the early 2010s.










Source: PitchBook | Geography: Global \*Historical AUM and forecasts generated on January 5, 2023

#### Year-over-year percent change in private debt AUM with base-case forecast\*



- II Research Finding I: Performance in terms of IRR, Multiples & PME
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## **Research Finding I:** Performance in terms of IRR, Multiples & PME

Inancial Analysis Journal | A Publication of CFA Institute https://doi.org/10.1080/00151980.2022.209238

### **A OPEN ACCESS** Private Debt Fund **Returns, Persistence, and** Market Conditions

#### Pascal Böni and Sophie Manigart

Pascal Bini is professor of practice in finance and private debt at Tilburg University, Tilburg School of Economics and Management, asso ate professor of finance at Tilbury University, TIAS School for Business and Society, Tilbury, the Netherlands, and the managing director of Tilbury Institute for Private Debt (TPD). Sophic Manigari is full professor of corporate finance and faculty dean at Vierick Business School and full professor at Chent University, Belgium. Send correspondence to Pascal Boni at pascal borni@tilburguniversity.edu.

#### This paper examines net-of-fees pri- Introduction ge investigate private debt (PD) fund performance and deter

vate debt fund performance, performance persistence across funds managed by the same general partner and a general partner's ability to time the market. We document that private debt funds outperform bond affect fund performance, general

and equity market benchmarks in the under management in 2020 (Pregin Pro 2021). As of today, PD funds' cross-section, with high performance assets under management represent some important 12.3% of the dispersion across strategies and per- aggregate value of private capital funds. They approximately match formance quartiles. Lagged perform- the size of real-estate funds (\$1.15 trillion) and have outgrown infra ance significantly affects current fund structure (\$0.8 trillion) and natural resources (\$0.2 trillion) funds performance. While ex ante and ex (Pregin Pro 2021). This growth has been driven by a surge in the post credit market conditions strongly demand for non-bank private debt, as banks retrenched from cash flow-based lending to the middle market after the Global Financial partners can only partially time them. Crisis due to increased bank regulation and the resulting reduction in risk appetite on the part of the banks (see, for example, Langfield and Keywords: credit market conditions; Pagano 2016; van der Veer and Hoeberichts 2016; Bordo and Duca performance persistence; private

debt; private markets; return; skill Disclosure: In accordance with Taylor & Francis policy and our ethical obligation as researchers, we report that one of two searchers acts as consultant to institutional investors interested in PD fund investments. His employer may be affected by the research reported in the enclosed paper. We disclose those interests fully to Taylor & Francis. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the researcher's employer

market timing; performance;

Despite the growing importance of PD funds, which have reached average fund sizes exceeding \$1.3 billion (in 2018 US dollars), our understanding of PD fund returns to limited partners (LPs) is limited We thank the editors, two anonymous referees, M. Da Rin, P.P.M. Joas, F.A. de Roon, I.I.A.G. Driessen, P.G.J. Rosenboom, A. Vierriesi, D.I.D. Cummings as well as Comr distri

minants thereof. PD funds represent an important segment

unlisted assets and tripled their market capitalization since the

COVID-19 pandemic induced market sell-off.<sup>1</sup> PD funds emerged as

an asset class in the late 1990s and exceeded \$1.1 trillion assets

of the private capital industry, which soared on the boom in

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Volume 78, Number 4

2018; Cortés et al. 2020). Also, PD fund growth was spurred by an increase in the supply of capital by yield-seeking institutional investors challenged by a low-vield environment in traditional credit markets.

Research

seminar participants at Ghent University, for valuable comments on previous ver-	
sions of the paper. We acknowledge Remaco for the use of the Pregin data.	
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### https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/001519 8X.2022.2092384?needAccess=true&role=button



IN         Mean         Mean         Mean         Mean         Mean         Mean         SD         1st         Sth         25th         75th         95th         97th           Interval cate of return (IRR)         148         9.19         R.46         14.81         -330         -7.12         5.11         12.28         27.7         57.41           Scoord quartile         112         20.1         10.0         10.         8.5         8.2         9.7         11.10         11.8         12.8         27.7         57.41         57.4         6.0         12.2         27.7         57.41         57.4         6.0         6.0         4.3         17.8         6.20         4.3         17.8         6.20         4.3         17.8         6.4         4.8         8.81           R. Core-sectional performance, measured by net multiples (multiple)         50         1.54         5.0         7.54         9.54         9.94										ercent	lor.		
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	IRR		N	Mean	Median	SD .	1st	50				95th	99th
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	Internal rate of return	(188)	448	0 10	846	14.81	33.90	7	12	5.11	12.28	27.71	57.14
Nind quantitie         112         7.0         7.2         1.0         5.1         5.3         6.1         8.0         8.4         8.5           High-tow (quantities)         27.0         1.5         7.1         1.6         6.0         7.1         5.3         6.1         8.0         8.4         8.5           Regin-tow (quantities)         27.0         1.5         7.1         1.6         6.0         7.1         3.1         3.0         7.4         8.0         8.4         8.5           B. Cross-sciental performance, measured by net multiple:         nuttiple:         Ferrecruits         Ferrecruits         9.7         9.6         7.6         9.6         9.7		had											
	Second guartile		112	10.1	10.0	1.0	8.5	8	7	9.1	11.0	11.8	12.2
High-Ison (quantifies)         27.0         15.7         18.1         68.0         41.3         19.8         22.0         43.8         88.1           B. Cross sectional performance, measured by net multiples (multiple)         Percentiles           Multiples         N         Mean         Media         50.         14.5         59.4         75.6         95.4         97.8         97.9         97.8         10.8         1.10         1.11         1.11         1.13         1.19         1.23         1.20         1.21         1.20         1.10         1.10         1.10         1.10         1.10         1.10         1.11         1.11         1.13         1.19         1.23         1.22         1.22         1.22	Third quartile		112	7.0	7.2	1.0	5.1	5.	3	6.1	8.0	8.4	8.5
B. Cross-sectional performance, measured by net multiplet (multiplet)           Intermediate interme	Bottom guartile		112	-3.6	0.9	11.9	-55.7	-28	3 -	5.8	3.2	4.4	5.0
N         Mean         Median         SD         1st         Sth         Percentiles           Net multiple:         N         Mean         Median         SD         1st         Sth         75h         95h         97th         13th         10th         11th         11th <t< td=""><td>High-low (quartiles)</td><td></td><td></td><td>27.0</td><td>15.7</td><td>18.1</td><td>68.0</td><td>41</td><td>3 1</td><td>9.8</td><td>22.0</td><td>43.8</td><td>88.1</td></t<>	High-low (quartiles)			27.0	15.7	18.1	68.0	41	3 1	9.8	22.0	43.8	88.1
	B. Cross-sectional perfo	rmance	meas	ured by I	et multiple	es (multipl	1						
$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$										erceni	tiles		
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	Multiples	Ν	M	san I	Median	SD	1st	5th	25	th	75th	95th	99ti
	Net multiples (X)	436	1.	30	1.24	0.35	0.57	0.85			1.45	1.93	2.58
Nind quartitie         100         1.16         1.16         1.16         0.17         0.27         1.22         1.22         1.22         1.22         1.22         1.22         1.22         1.22         1.23         1.20         1.10         1.11         1.11         1.13         1.19         1.12         1.22         1.23         1.23         1.20         1.10         1.11         1.11         1.13         1.19         1.12         1.22         1.23         1.23         1.20         1.10         1.11         1.13         1.19         1.12         1.23         1.20         1.21         1.20         1.21         1.20         1.22         2.00           C Cross actional performance, measured by public market equivalent (MHL), using the investment grade boxhumek (BC)         Proceeding         Proceed	Top quartile	106	1.	76	1.65	0.35	1.46	1.48	1.5	54	1.88	2.42	3.12
		112	1.	33	1.31	0.06	1.24	1.24					1.45
High-low (quartiles)         0.79         0.62         0.31         0.96         0.59         0.59         0.50         1.32         2.05           C. Gross sectional performance, measured by public market equivalent (PML) using the investment guade boothnears, RG         Image: Constraint of the section of the sect	Third quartile	106	1.	16	1.16	0.04	1.11	1.11	1.1	13	1.19	1.23	1.23
C. Coss sectional performance, measured by public market equivalent (PME), using the investment grade benchmark (PME).         Perconflics.           PME (K         N         Mean         Medan         SD         1st         5         7st         9sth         9th           PME (K         N         Mean         Medan         SD         1st         5         1st         5         1st         9th         9th           PME (K         N         Mean         Medan         SD         2st         5         7sth         9th         9th         9th           PME (K         N         Mean         Medan         SD         0.25         0.51         1.02         1.03         1.5         1.02         0.23         0.55         0.24         0.51         1.05         1.05         1.02         1.14         1.15         1.12         1.14         1.15         1.12         1.14         1.15         1.05         0.55         0.54         0.54         0.51         0.51         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05         1.05 <td></td> <td>112</td> <td></td> <td>1.10</td>		112											1.10
N         Mean         Median         Std         54b         Percentiles           PABLIC market equivalent (PML)E         448         1.08         1.05         0.25         0.51         5.07         9.54         954h         99th           Pablic market equivalent (PML)E         448         1.08         1.05         0.25         0.51         1.07         0.96         1.51         5.07         0.95         954h         99th           Coord quartile         112         1.10         1.00         0.02         0.51         1.05         1.06         0.07         0.51         1.07         1.04         1.05         0.07         1.03         1.04         2.00         2.38         5.06         9.34         9.02         2.38         5.06         9.34         9.02         2.38         5.06         9.34         9.02         9.05         1.0	High-low (quartiles)		0.	79	0.62	0.31	0.96	0.89	0.	59	0.80	1.32	2.02
Public market equivalent (PME) - HG         448         1.08         1.05         0.25         0.51         0.73         0.96         1.15         1.50         2.02           Top quartic         112         1.38         1.30         0.26         1.15         1.16         1.15         1.50         2.33           Top quartic         112         1.38         1.30         0.26         1.15         1.16         1.15         1.50         2.33           Top quartic         112         1.01         1.02         0.26         0.47         0.97         0.97         0.97         0.92         0.55         0.46           Heigh-tow (quartic)         112         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.25         0.56         0.46         0.40         0.40         0.16         1.05	and a second perfe	ormance	, meas	ured by p	ublic mari	ket equival	ent (PME	), using	the in	restme	nt grade	benchm	ark (IG)
Top quartite         112         1.38         1.30         0.26         1.15         1.16         1.20         1.43         2.00         2.38           Scoord quartite         112         1.00         1.00         0.02         0.84         0.97         1.00         1.04         2.00         2.38           Thed quartite         112         1.01         1.01         0.02         0.94         0.97         0.01         1.04         1.05           Ligh- bw quartite         112         1.05         0.67         0.63         0.40         0.64         0.41         0.50         1.05         1.05         1.07         1.05         1.05         1.07         1.05		ormance	, meas							Pen	entiles		
Second quartile         112         1.00         0.00         0.00         0.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         0.00		ormanice	, meas							Pen	entiles		
Phile quartifie         112         101         0.01         0.02         0.96         0.97         0.99         1.03         1.04         1.05           Biotion quartifie         112         0.82         0.87         0.14         0.31         0.52         0.79         0.97         0.97         0.57         0.78         0.7	PME IG Public market equivale			N 448	Mean 1.08	Median 1.05	SD 0.25	1st 0.51	5th 0.73	Pen 25th 0.96	75th	95th 1.50	99th 2.03
Bottom quartite (hgh-hw (quartite)         12         0.28         0.87         0.14         0.31         0.52         0.97         0.97         0.95         0.95         0.96           C. Cross sectional performance, measured by public market equivalent (PME) using the hgh-yield benchmark (PME)         using the hgh-yield benchmark (PME)         target hgh-yield benchmark (PME)           PME HY         N         Moon         Moon         50         1.65	PME IG Public market equivale Top quartile			N 448 112	Mean 1.08 1.38	Median 1.05 1.30	SD 0.25 0.26	1st 0.51 1.15	5th 0.73 1.16	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20	25th 1.15 1.43	95th 1.50 2.00	99th 2.03 2.38
High-low (quartilec)         0.55         0.43         0.24         0.84         0.43         0.11         1.05         1.05         1.42           D. Cross sectional performance, measured by public market equivalent (PME), using the high-sectional performance, measured by public market equivalent (PME), using the high-sectional performance, measured by public market equivalent (PME), using the high-sectional performance, measured by public market equivalent (PME), using the high-sectional performance, measured by public market equivalent (PME), using the high-sectional performance (PME), using the high-sectiona performance (PME), using the high-sectional performance (PME), u	PME KG Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile			N 448 112 112	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10	Median 1.05 1.30 1.10	SD 0.25 0.26 0.03	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 1.07	75th 1.15 1.43 1.12	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15
D. Cross-sectional performance, measured by public market equivalent (PME) using the high-yield boochmark (PME)         Percentiles         Percentiles           PME HY         N         Mean         Modian         5D         1st         5d         2st         7st         9st         9st           PME HY         N         Mean         Modian         5D         1st         5d         2st         7st         9st         9st           Top quartitic         112         1.23         1.24         0.26         1.13         1.14         1.39         1.45         1.39         1.44         2.33         1.16         1.30         1.04         1.24         1.03         1.05         1.01         1.01         1.02         1.01         1.02         1.01         1.02         1.01         1.02         1.01         1.02         1.01         1.02         1.02         1.02         1.04         1.03           Top quartitic         112         1.03         1.02         1.04         1.03         1.02         1.04         1.02         1.02         1.04         1.02           Top quartitic         112         1.03         0.05         0.06         0.07         0.07         0.07         0.07         0.07	PME IG Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile Third quartile			N 448 112 112 112	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01	Median 1.05 1.30 1.10 1.01	SD 0.25 0.26 0.03 0.02	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 1.07 0.99	75th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 1.04	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 1.05
PME HY         N         Mcan         Median         5D         1st         5h         25h         7sth         9sth         99th           Public market equivalent [PME] - HY         448         1.06         1.04         0.24         0.50         0.75         1.31         1.51         1.53         1.90           Public market equivalent [PME] - HY         448         1.06         1.04         0.24         0.50         0.72         0.75         1.31         1.51         1.53         1.90           Scoord quarkite         112         1.38         1.08         0.03         1.04	PME IG Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile Third quartile Bottom quartile			N 448 112 112 112	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.82	Median 1.05 1.30 1.10 1.01 0.87	SD 0.25 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.14	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 1.07 0.99 0.79	75th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 1.04 0.95	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 1.05 0.96
PME HY         N         Mean         Median         SD         1st         Sh         2sh         7sh         9sh         9sh<	PME IG Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile Third quartile Bottom quartile			N 448 112 112 112	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.82	Median 1.05 1.30 1.10 1.01 0.87	SD 0.25 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.14	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 1.07 0.99 0.79	75th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 1.04 0.95	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 1.05 0.96
Hubic market equivalent (PMI)-HY         440         1.06         1.04         0.24         0.50         0.72         0.95         1.13         1.45         1.90           Top quartic         112         1.33         1.24         0.26         1.13         1.14         1.39         1.82         2.33           Hord quartic         112         1.33         1.24         0.26         1.13         1.14         1.39         1.82         2.33           Hord quartic         112         1.01         1.00         0.02         0.56         0.69         1.02         1.04         1.02         1.03         1.02<	PME KG Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile Bottom quartile Bottom quartile High-low (quartiles)	ent (PM	E) —IC	N 448 112 112 112 112	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.82 0.55	Median 1.05 1.30 1.10 1.01 0.87 0.43	SD 0.25 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.24	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31 0.84	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52 0.63	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 1.07 0.99 0.79 0.41	75th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92 0.51	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 1.04 0.95 1.05	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 1.05 0.96 1.42
Top quarité         112         1.23         1.24         0.26         1.13         1.14         1.88         1.39         1.84         2.33           Second quarité         112         1.08         1.08         0.03         1.04         1.05         1.06         1.11         1.12         1.31           Nind quarité         112         1.08         1.08         0.03         1.04         1.05         1.06         1.11         1.12         1.31           Bottom quarité         112         1.01         1.03         0.95         0.96         0.97         1.02         1.04         1.04           Bottom quarité         112         1.02         1.08         0.85         0.14         0.31         0.26         0.79         0.95         0.46         0.37	PME KG Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile Bottom quartile Bottom quartile High-low (quartiles)	ent (PM	E) —IC	N 448 112 112 112 112	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.82 0.55	Median 1.05 1.30 1.10 1.01 0.87 0.43	SD 0.25 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.24	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31 0.84	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52 0.63	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 1.07 0.99 0.79 0.41 gh yick	centiles 75th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92 0.51	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 1.04 0.95 1.05	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 1.05 0.96 1.42
Second quartite         112         1.08         0.03         1.04         1.05         1.06         1.11         1.12         1.13           Ind quartite         112         1.01         1.03         0.05         0.96         0.97         1.02         1.04         1.04           Bottom quartite         112         0.81         0.85         0.14         0.25         0.76         0.91         0.95         0.96         0.97         1.02         1.04         1.04           Bottom quartite         120         0.81         0.85         0.14         0.21         0.26         0.47         0.95         0.96         0.97         1.02         1.04         1.04           Bottom quartite         112         0.81         0.85         0.14         0.21         0.47         0.97         0.95         0.96         0.97         0.91         0.95 <td>PME IG Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile Third quartile Bottom quartile Bigh-low (quartiles) D. Cross-sectional perfe</td> <td>ent (PM</td> <td>E) —IC</td> <td>N 448 112 112 112 112 112</td> <td>Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.82 0.55 sublic mark</td> <td>Median 1.05 1.30 1.10 1.01 0.87 0.43 ket equival</td> <td>SD 0.25 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.24 kent (PMI</td> <td>1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31 0.84 E), using</td> <td>5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52 0.63 the hi</td> <td>Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 1.07 0.99 0.79 0.41 gh-yick Per</td> <td>centiles 75th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92 0.51 f benchn centiles</td> <td>95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 1.04 0.95 1.05 sark (HY</td> <td>99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 1.05 0.96 1.42</td>	PME IG Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile Third quartile Bottom quartile Bigh-low (quartiles) D. Cross-sectional perfe	ent (PM	E) —IC	N 448 112 112 112 112 112	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.82 0.55 sublic mark	Median 1.05 1.30 1.10 1.01 0.87 0.43 ket equival	SD 0.25 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.24 kent (PMI	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31 0.84 E), using	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52 0.63 the hi	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 1.07 0.99 0.79 0.41 gh-yick Per	centiles 75th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92 0.51 f benchn centiles	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 1.04 0.95 1.05 sark (HY	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 1.05 0.96 1.42
Third quartile         112         1.01         0.03         0.95         0.96         0.99         1.02         1.04         1.04           Bottom quartile         112         0.81         0.85         0.14         0.31         0.50         0.76         0.91         0.95<	PME KG Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile Bottom quartile High-low (quartiles) D. Cross-sectional perfo PME HY Public market equivale	ent (PM	E) —IG	N 448 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 11	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.82 0.55 sublic mark Mean 8 1.06	Median 1.05 1.30 1.01 0.87 0.43 ket equival Median 1.04	SD 0.25 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.24 lent (PMI SD 0.24	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31 0.84 E), using 1st 0.50	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52 0.63 the hi 5th 0.72	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 1.07 0.99 0.79 0.41 gh yiek Per 25th 0.95	275th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92 0.51 1 benchn centiles 75th 1.13	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 1.04 0.95 1.05 sark (HY 95th 1.45	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 1.05 0.96 1.42 ) 99th 1.90
Bottom quartile 112 0.81 0.85 0.14 0.31 0.50 0.76 0.91 0.95 0.95 High-low (quartiles) 0.52 0.40 0.23 0.82 0.64 0.43 0.48 0.89 1.38	PME KG Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile High-low (quartile High-low (quartile D. Cross sectional perfo PME HY Public market equivale	ent (PM	E) —IG	N 448 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 11	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.82 0.55 sublic mark Mean 8 1.06 2 1.33	Median 1.05 1.30 1.01 0.87 0.43 ket equival Median 1.04 1.24	SD 0.25 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.24 kent (PMB SD 0.24 0.24 0.26	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31 0.84 [] using 1st 0.50 1.13	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52 0.63 the hi 5th 0.72 1.14	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 0.99 0.79 0.41 gh yiek Per 25th 0.95 1.18	275th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92 0.51 f benchn centiles 75th 1.13 1.39	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 1.04 0.95 1.05 sork (HY 95th 1.45 1.84	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 1.05 0.96 1.42 ) 99th 1.90 2.33
High-low (quartiles) 0.52 0.40 0.23 0.82 0.64 0.43 0.48 0.89 1.38	PME IG Public market equivale top quartile Second quartile Bottom quartile Bottom quartile Bottom quartile Bottom quartile D. Cross sectional perfe PME HY Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile	ent (PM	E) —IG	N 448 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 11	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 0.82 0.55 sublic mark Mean 8 1.06 2 1.33 2 1.06	Median 1.05 1.30 1.01 0.87 0.43 ket equival Median 1.04 1.24 1.08	SD 0.25 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.24 ent (PM SD 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.03	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31 0.84 E], using 1st 0.50 1.13 1.04	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52 0.63 the hij 5th 0.72 1.14 1.05	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 0.99 0.79 0.41 9b yield Per 25th 0.95 1.18 1.06	275th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92 0.51 1 benchn centiles 75th 1.13 1.39 1.11	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 1.04 0.95 1.05 teark (HY 95th 1.45 1.84 1.12	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 1.05 0.96 1.42 ) 99th 1.90 2.33 1.13
	PME KG Public market equivale Second quartile Socion quartile Bottom quartile Bottom quartile Bottom quartile D. Cross sectional perfo PME HY Public market equivale Second quartile Second quartile	ent (PM	E) —IG	N 448 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 N V 448 111 112	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 0.55 sublic mark Mean 3 1.06 2 1.33 2 1.06 2 1.01	Median 1.05 1.30 1.10 1.01 0.87 0.43 ket equival ket equival 1.04 1.24 1.08 1.01	SD 0.25 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.24 ent (PM4 SD 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.03 0.03	1st 0.51 1.15 0.96 0.31 0.84 E) using 1st 0.50 1.13 1.04 0.95	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52 0.63 the hit 5th 0.72 1.14 1.05 0.96	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 0.99 0.79 0.41 9b yield Per 25th 0.95 1.18 1.06 0.99	275th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92 0.51 1 benchn centiles 75th 1.13 1.39 1.11 1.02	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 1.04 0.95 1.05 nark (HY 95th 1.45 1.84 1.12 1.04	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 1.05 0.96 1.42 ) 99th 1.90 2.33 1.13 1.04
(continued	PME KG Public market equivale Second quartile Second quartile Biotion quartile Biotion quartile D. Cross-sectional perfe- PME HY Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile Biotion quartile Biotion quartile	ent (PM	E) —IG	N 448 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 N V 448 111 112	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.82 0.55 mean 8 1.06 2 1.33 2 1.08 2 1.01 2 0.81 3 1.06 2 1.01 2 0.81 3 1.06 2 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.05 1.06 2 1.08 2 1.08 2 1.00 2 1.00 2 1.01 2 1.00 2 1.00 2 1.01 2 1.00 2 1.01 2 0.05 1.00 2 1.01 2 0.05 1.01 2 0.05 1.05 1.05 1.06 2 1.01 2 0.05 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.05 1	Median 1.05 1.00 1.10 1.01 0.87 0.43 ket equival Median 1.04 1.24 1.08 1.04 1.24 1.08 1.01 0.85	SD 0.25 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.24 ent (PMI SD 0.24 0.26 0.03 0.03 0.14	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31 0.84 1.15 1.08 1.13 1.04 0.95 0.31	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52 0.63 the hi 5th 0.72 1.14 1.05 0.96 0.50	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 0.99 0.79 0.41 9b yiek Per 25th 0.95 1.18 1.06 0.99 0.76	75th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92 0.51 1 benchn centiles 75th 1.13 1.39 1.11 1.39 1.11	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 0.95 1.05 8ark (HY 95th 1.45 1.84 1.12 1.04 0.95	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 1.05 0.96 1.42 99th 1.90 2.33 1.04 0.95
	PME KG Public market equivale Second quartile Second quartile Biotion quartile Biotion quartile D. Cross-sectional perfe- PME HY Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile Biotion quartile Biotion quartile	ent (PM	E) —IG	N 448 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 N V 448 112 112 112	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.82 0.55 mean 8 1.06 2 1.33 2 1.08 2 1.01 2 0.81 3 1.06 2 1.01 2 0.81 3 1.06 2 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.05 1.06 2 1.08 2 1.08 2 1.00 2 1.00 2 1.01 2 1.00 2 1.00 2 1.01 2 1.00 2 1.01 2 0.05 1.00 2 1.01 2 0.05 1.01 2 0.05 1.05 1.05 1.06 2 1.01 2 0.05 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.05 1	Median 1.05 1.00 1.10 1.01 0.87 0.43 ket equival Median 1.04 1.24 1.08 1.04 1.24 1.08 1.01 0.85	SD 0.25 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.24 ent (PMI SD 0.24 0.26 0.03 0.03 0.14	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31 0.84 1.15 1.08 1.13 1.04 0.95 0.31	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52 0.63 the hi 5th 0.72 1.14 1.05 0.96 0.50	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 0.99 0.79 0.41 9b yiek Per 25th 0.95 1.18 1.06 0.99 0.76	75th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92 0.51 1 benchn centiles 75th 1.13 1.39 1.11 1.39 1.11	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 0.95 1.05 8ark (HY 95th 1.45 1.84 1.12 1.04 0.95 0.89	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 0.96 1.42 ) 99th 1.90 2.33 1.13 1.04 0.95 1.38
	PME KG Public market equivale top quartile Second quartile Bottom quartile Bittom quartile PME HY Public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile Bottom quartile Bottom quartile	ent (PM	E) —IG	N 448 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 N V 448 112 112 112	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.82 0.55 mean 8 1.06 2 1.33 2 1.08 2 1.01 2 0.81 3 1.06 2 1.01 2 0.81 3 1.06 2 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.05 1.06 2 1.08 2 1.08 2 1.00 2 1.00 2 1.01 2 1.00 2 1.00 2 1.01 2 1.00 2 1.01 2 0.05 1.00 2 1.01 2 0.05 1.01 2 0.05 1.05 1.05 1.06 2 1.01 2 0.05 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.05 1	Median 1.05 1.00 1.10 1.01 0.87 0.43 ket equival Median 1.04 1.24 1.08 1.04 1.24 1.08 1.01 0.85	SD 0.25 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.24 ent (PMI SD 0.24 0.26 0.03 0.03 0.14	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31 0.84 1.15 1.08 1.13 1.04 0.95 0.31	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52 0.63 the hi 5th 0.72 1.14 1.05 0.96 0.50	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 0.99 0.79 0.41 9b yiek Per 25th 0.95 1.18 1.06 0.99 0.76	75th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92 0.51 1 benchn centiles 75th 1.13 1.39 1.11 1.39 1.11	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 0.95 1.05 8ark (HY 95th 1.45 1.84 1.12 1.04 0.95 0.89	99th 2.03 2.38 1.15 0.96 1.42 7 99th 1.90 2.33 1.13 1.04 0.95 1.38 tinued
Volume 70, Number 4 12	PME KG Public market equivale top quartile Second quartile Second quartile Biottom quartile public market equivale Top quartile Second quartile Biottom quartile Biottom quartile Biottom quartile	ent (PM	E) —IG	N 448 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 N V 448 112 112 112	Mean 1.08 1.38 1.10 1.01 0.82 0.55 mean 8 1.06 2 1.33 2 1.08 2 1.01 2 0.81 3 1.06 2 1.01 2 0.81 3 1.06 2 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 0.55 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.05 1.06 2 1.08 2 1.08 2 1.00 2 1.00 2 1.01 2 1.00 2 1.00 2 1.01 2 1.00 2 1.01 2 0.05 1.00 2 1.01 2 0.05 1.01 2 0.05 1.05 1.05 1.06 2 1.01 2 0.05 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.05 1	Median 1.05 1.00 1.10 1.01 0.87 0.43 ket equival Median 1.04 1.24 1.08 1.04 1.24 1.08 1.01 0.85	SD 0.25 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.24 ent (PMI SD 0.24 0.26 0.03 0.03 0.14	1st 0.51 1.15 1.05 0.96 0.31 0.84 1.15 1.08 1.13 1.04 0.95 0.31	5th 0.73 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.52 0.63 the hi 5th 0.72 1.14 1.05 0.96 0.50	Pen 25th 0.96 1.20 0.99 0.79 0.41 9b yiek Per 25th 0.95 1.18 1.06 0.99 0.76	75th 1.15 1.43 1.12 1.03 0.92 0.51 1 benchn centiles 75th 1.13 1.39 1.11 1.39 1.11	95th 1.50 2.00 1.14 0.95 1.05 8ark (HY 95th 1.45 1.84 1.12 1.04 0.95 0.89	999th 2.03 2.38 1.15 0.96 1.42 ) 999th 1.90 2.33 1.13 1.04 0.95 1.38

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E. Cross-sectional performance, measured by pe	ablic me	arket egi	rivalent (Pl	ME), usi	ing the	equity	market	benchn	vark (S&	P500
Percentiles										
PME 56P 500	N	Mean	Median	SD	1st	5th	25th	75th	95th	998
Public market equivalent (PME) -S&P 500	448	1.06	1.01	0.30	0.51	0.71	0.92	1.14	1.55	2.0
Top guartile	112	1.42	1.34	0.35	1.14	1.15	1.21	1.50	1.95	2.5
Second quartile	112	1.06	1.06	0.04	1.01	1.01	1.03	1.09	1.13	1.1
Third guartile	112	0.96	0.96	0.03	0.92	0.92	0.94	0.98	1.00	1.0
Bottom guartile	112	0.79	0.83	0.13	0.40	0.53	0.74	0.89	0.91	0.9
High-low (quartiles)		0.63	0.51	0.33	0.74	0.62	0.47	0.61	1.04	1.6

This take reports on the portionness of private shell tranks in the torus settim and by portionness, quartice. These A reports on the portion dust factors, mounted by the intermedian dust of tranks (b) dowing the more, modian, stateding the portion dust factors, build be and work performance (big) holes the torus setting the port work with the state of t nce of private debt funds in the cross-section and by pe

### Internal Rate of Return (IRR)

9.2% (-3.6% - 23.3%)

### Investment-Multiple 1.3X(0.8X - 1.8X)

### Public Market Equivalent vs. IG-Bonds 8% (-18% - 38%)

### Public Market Equivalent vs. HY-Bonds

4% (-19% - 33%)

### Public Market Equivalent vs. S&P 500

6% (-21% - 42%)

# **Research Finding II: Performance in terms of Alpha**

#### UNCOVERING THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMPONENTS OF PRIVATE DEBT RETURNS

#### January 15, 2023

Pascal Bini Tolburg University, The Netherlands Tilburg School of Economics and Management (TISEM) and TIAS School for Business and Society

#### Frans de Roon

Tilburg University, The Netherlands TLAS School for Business and Society and Tilburg School of Economics and Management (TiSEM)

#### Abstract

We investigate private debt find returns, discrimangling them into a publicity traded and a private component. Studying their finne-series and cross-sectional properties, we find a significant pervate debt premium of meand 1.6% per quarter. We establish that find returns are negatively skewed and have long exposure to high yeigh bands and stocks and short exposures to investment grade bends, together explaining up to 70% of return variation. Regressing the private debt premium on its factor loads in the cross-section of individual finds, the pare private return component amounts to 2.2%, on average, and is negatively affected by exposures to traded factors. Return shortware between an private return component and inded factors. Return shortware by higher downside-beta than upside-betas. We find a pointive tackould bebreen negative skew and mean returns and a reward-to-expected shortfall ratio that is mare favorable for private debt funds as compared to the traded portfolion by a factor of ten.

JEL classification: G11, G12, G20, G23, G30 Keywords : Private Market, Private debt, Returna, Performance, Skewness, Value at Risk, Expected Shortfall

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			Par	el A: Single F	actor Marke	t Model			
	_	All I	Funds		F-test				
									p-values
		Mean	Median					Direct Lending	
α	BBIG	1.47%	0.94%	2.02%	0.42%	3.53%	1.39%	1.65%	0.0000
		(3.79)	(3.9)	(3.85)	(0.75)	(3.49)	(1.95)	(3.4)	
Σβ <sub>Dimson</sub>		0.526	0.433	0.434	0.941	-0.586	0.568	0.447	0.0003
		(2.76)	(3.66)	(1.78)	(3.55)	(1.27)	(1.48)	(1.57)	
R <sup>2</sup>		24%	29%	8%	26%	11%	30%	18%	
α	BBHY	1.44%	0.97%	2.07%	0.46%	2.53%	1.26%	1.37%	0.0000
		(5.4)	(6.21)	(4.53)	(1.19)	(2.66)	(2.2)	(3.67)	
Σβ <sub>Dimson</sub>		0.476	0.354	0.334	0.779	0.089	0.623	0.676	0.0001
		(5.37)	(6.84)	(2.4)	(6.37)	(0.32)	(2.81)	(3.75)	
R <sup>2</sup>		55%	63%	13%	56%	5%	43%	39%	
α	SPX	1.57%	1.02%	1.89%	0.90%	1.92%	1.42%	1.73%	0.0000
		(5.27)	(6.27)	(4.67)	(2.00)	(2.16)	(2.12)	(3.47)	
Σβ <sub>Dimson</sub>		0.286	0.235	0.371	0.387	0.404	0.324	0.175	0.0001
		(3.73)	(5.62)	(3.8)	(3.43)	(1.88)	(1.7)	(1.04)	
R <sup>2</sup>		44%	60%	28%	38%	12%	32%	26%	
			Panel B:	Three Factor M	Aarket Mod	el			F-test
		All I	Funds			By Stra	tegy		p-values
		Mean	Median	Mezzanine	Distressed	Venture	Special Sit.	Direct	
a	3factor	1.60%	1.00%	1.96%	0.71%	3.61%	1.33%	2.07%	0.0000
		(5.65)	(7.12)	(4.16)	(1.76)	(4.66)	(1.95)	(4.16)	
Σβ <sub>Dimson</sub>	BBIG	-0.502	-0.216	-0.12	-0.578	-2.929	-0.717	-0.613	0.0005
		(2.05)	(1.78)	(0.28)	(1.62)	(3.98)	(1.34)	(1.88)	
Σβ <sub>Dimson</sub>	BBHY	0.531	0.257	-0.05	0.95	1.187	0.914	1.148	0.0005
		(3.00)	(2.91)	(0.16)	(3.72)	(2.22)	(2.21)	(4.02)	
Σβ <sub>Dimson</sub>	SPX	0.198	0.2	0.455	0.109	0.601	0.199	-0.255	0.0002
		(2.15)	(4.36)	(3.08)	(0.85)	(2.38)	(0.82)	(1.25)	
R <sup>2</sup>		65%	79%	33%	65%	53%	49%	45%	

- II Research Finding I: Performance in terms of IRR, Multiples & PME
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- **IV Research Finding III: Why Firms Borrow Directly from Nonbanks**
- V Research Finding IV: ESG of Private Market Funds
- VI Research Finding V: The Bank Lending Channel and Private Market Growth



## Research Finding III: Why Firms Borrow Directly From Non-Banks

### **Bank Substitution**

Chernenko, S., Erel, I., Prilmeier, R., 2022. Why Do Firms Borrow Directly from Nonbanks? Review of Financial Studies 35, 4902-4947.

Loumioti, Maria, Direct Lending: The Determinants, Characteristics and Performance of Direct Loans (May 30, 2022). Available at SSRN: <u>https://ssrn.com/abstract=3450841</u> or <u>http://dx.doi.</u> org/10.2139/ssrn.3450841

### Public Market Substitution

Schlinemann, F.P., Stulz, R.,M., 2022. Have exchange-listed firms become less important for the economy? Journal of Financial Economics 143, 927-958.

Doidge, C., Karolyi, G.A., Stulz, R.M., 2017. The U.S. listing gap. Journal of Financial Economics 123, 464-487.

Ewens, M., Farre-Mensa, J., 2022. Private or Public Equity? The Evolving Entrepreneurial Finance Landscape. Annual Review of Financial Economics 14, 271-293.

Kim, J., Olbert, M., 2022. How does private firm disclosure affect demand for public firm equity? Evidence from the global equity market. Journal of Accounting and Economics 74.

Aghamolla, C., Thakor, R.T., 2021. Do Mandatory Disclosure Requirements for Private Firms Increase the Propensity of Going Public? Journal of Accounting Research July 21.

### Credit Space Expansion (Capital Solutions)


Chernenko, S., Erel, I., Prilmeier, R., 2022. Why Do Firms Borrow Directly from Nonbanks? Review of Financial Studies 35, 4902-4947.

Loumioti, Maria, Direct Lending: The Determinants, Characteristics and Performance of Direct Loans (May 30, 2022). Available at SSRN: <u>https://ssrn.com/abstract=3450841</u> or <u>http://dx.doi.</u> org/10.2139/ssrn.3450841



## Research Finding III: Why Firms Borrow Directly From Non-Banks

Figure 1: US Initial Public Offerings vs. PE Funds Raised.



Abraham, Jefferson Kaduvinal, Olbert, Marcel and Vasvari, Florin P., ESG Disclosures in the Private Equity Industry (November 1, 2022). Available at SSRN: <u>https://ssrn.com/abstract=4265171</u> or <u>http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4265171</u>



# **Research Finding III: Determinants, Characteristics and Performance of Direct Loans**

- I Corporate loans originated by nonbank institutional investors without banks' intermediation.
- II DL activity increases when commercial banks face greater regulatory pressure.
- III DL activity increases during periods of weak bank loan and securitized debt issuance.
- **IV** Particularly active in geographic regions that experience more bank mergers.
- V Focus on informationally opaque borrowers with limited credit history and few financing alternatives.
- VI Higher interest rate, more flexible covenant structures and are more likely to be secured by borrower's capital stock compared to institutional loans issued by banks.
- VII Similar or somewhat better post-issuance performance compared to bank-originated institutional loans.
- VIII Direct lending expanded the credit space without giving rise to adverse selection costs.

Loumioti, Maria, Direct Lending: The Determinants, Characteristics and Performance of Direct Loans (May 30, 2022). Available at SSRN: <u>https://ssrn.com/abstract=3450841</u> or <u>http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3450841</u>



# **Research Finding III:** Why Firms Borrow Directly from Nonbanks

- I Analyzing hand-collected credit agreements for a sample of middle-market firms over 2010– 2015
- II One-third of all loans are directly extended by nonbank financial intermediaries.
- III Two-thirds of such nonbank lending can be attributed to bank regulations that constrain banks' ability to lend to unprofitable and highly levered borrowers.
- IV Firms with negative EBITDA and debt/EBITDA greater than six are 32% and 15% more likely to borrow from nonbanks.
- V Firms pay significantly higher interest rates, especially following the 2013 leveraged loan guidance revisions.
- VI Nonbank borrowers also receive different nonprice terms compared to firms borrowing from banks.


Chernenko, S., Erel, I., Prilmeier, R., 2022. Why Do Firms Borrow Directly from Nonbanks? Review of Financial Studies 35, 4902-4947.



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# **Research Finding VI: ESG of Private Market Funds**






## **Research Finding VI: ESG of Private Market Funds**

### Figure 2: Comparison ESG Disclosure Public and Private Markets

Figure 2 represents the frequency of disclosure of several ESG indicators for our 4150 sample GPs, for the largest GPs in our sample that together represent 50% of total funds raised (N = 107), for financial firms in the FY2021 Refinitiv universe based on GICS Sector classifications, and for the full FY2021 Refinitiv universe excluding financials. The top bars represent disclosure frequency for our sample GPs, the second bars for large GPs, the third bars for Refinitiv financial firms, and the bottom bars for the full Refinitiv universe excluding financials.



Böni, Pascal and Hendrikse, Jurian and Joos, Philip, ESG Transparency of Private Equity and Debt Firms (November 30, 2022). Available at SSRN: <u>https://ssrn.com/abstract=4289573</u> or <u>http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4289</u> 573

Abraham, Jefferson Kaduvinal, Olbert, Marcel and Vasvari, Florin P., ESG Disclosures in the Private Equity Industry (November 1, 2022). Available at SSRN: <u>https://ssrn.com/abstract=4265171</u> or <u>http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4265</u> 171



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# Research Finding VII: The Bank Lending Channel and Private Market Growth

Are Private Markets Driven by Yield Seeking (only)? US Constant Maturity Treasury Yield





## Research Finding VII: The Bank Lending Channel and Private Market Growth

### Table 1 Importance of Bank Debt

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This table shows the mean proportions for seven types of debt for the 20 largest economies in the world according to the IMF (2021). The data are from Berger et al. (2021), who study capital structure of listed firms in 110 countries over 17 years from 2001 through 2018, covering 300,000 firm-year observations from nearly 60,000 corporations.


Country	B	ank Debt		Bonds		Other Types of Debt						
Country	Region	\$ trillion	Term Loans	Credit Lines	Σ	Senior Bonds	Sub. Bonds	Σ	Leases	Comm. Paper	Other Debt	Σ
United States	Americas	22,68	31%	17%	48%	33%	5%	38%	6%	1%	8%	15
China	Asia	16,64	82%	7%	89%	7%	0%	7%	2%	0%	2%	49
Japan	Asia	5,38	75%	6%	81%	9%	0%	9%	8%	0%	2%	10
Germany	Europe	4,32	62%	9%	71%	14%	1%	15%	7%	0%	7%	14
United Kingdom	Europe	3,12	43%	26%	69%	16%	1%	17%	10%	0%	4%	14
India	Asia	3,05	45%	28%	73%	4%	0%	4%	1%	1%	21%	23
France	Europe	2,94	49%	14%	63%	15%	1%	16%	7%	1%	14%	229
Italy	Europe	2,11	60%	12%	72%	12%	1%	13%	5%	0%	10%	159
+ Canada	Americas	1,88	30%	24%	54%	27%	5%	32%	7%	0%	5%	129
South Korea	Asia	1,81	35%	35%	70%	19%	0%	19%	1%	1%	9%	11
Russia	Europe	1,71	58%	11%	69%	16%	1%	17%	4%	0%	10%	14
Australia	Oceania	1,62	31%	31%	62%	15%	1%	16%	16%	0%	7%	23
Brazil	Americas	1,49	53%	14%	67%	18%	2%	20%	1%	0%	11%	12
s Spain	Europe	1,46	63%	11%	74%	11%	1%	12%	3%	0%	11%	14
Mexico	Americas	1,19	44%	8%	52%	35%	1%	36%	4%	0%	8%	12
Indonesia	Asia	1,16	43%	34%	77%	13%	1%	14%	6%	0%	4%	10
Netherlands	Europe	1,01	43%	23%	66%	18%	2%	20%	6%	1%	7%	14
Switzerland	Europe	0,82	43%	12%	55%	28%	1%	29%	5%	1%	9%	15
Saudi Arabia	Asia	0,80	65%	23%	88%	4%	2%	6%	2%	0%	3%	59
C• Turkey	Asia	0,79	80%	496	84%	3%	0%	3%	5%	0%	7%	12
20 Larg	est Economies		52%	17%	69%	16%	1%	17%	5%	0%	8%	14
A	mericas		40%	16%	55%	28%	3%	32%	5%	0%	8%	13
	Asia		61%	20%	80%	8%	0%	9%	4%	0%	7%	11
	Europe		56%	14%	69%	15%	1%	16%	6%	0%	9%	15

# Research Finding VII: The Bank Lending Channel and Private Market Growth

**Or does a Bank's Willingness to Lend drive Private Marktes?** Term Spread ~ a Bank's Net Interest Margin







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## Research Finding VII (PRELIMINARY): The Bank Lending Channel and Private Market Growth

 Bank Margin (Term spread<sub>10yr-6m</sub>)
 Performance Chasing (PM performance)

 Outside-in look:
 Yield Seeking (Level of CMT<sub>2</sub>)
 Credit standards tightening (Loan officers standards)

 Risk compensation (Credit spread)

 $\mathbf{y}_{t} = \boldsymbol{\beta}_{0} + \boldsymbol{\beta}_{1}\mathbf{x}_{t-2} + \mathbf{u}_{t}$ 

### Yield Seeking & PD: - 14 billion USD / quarter

«A treasury-yield increase by 1% does not affect capital commitments to PE, but reduces quarterly commitments to PD by 14 billion USD.

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### Bank Margin & PD: - 22 bil**l**ion USD / quarter

«A 1% increase of a bank's net interest margin reduces quarterly PE capital commitments by 57 billion US dollars and PD capital commitments by 22 billion USD. A bank's net interest margin thus importantly affects the flow of capital to private markets.»

### Performance Chasing & PD: + 3.6 billion / quarter

«An increase of performance by 1% increases quarterly capital commitments to PE by an approximate 5 billion USD and to PD by an approximate 3.6 billion USD. »

# What makes Private Debt special?

- Renditesuchende Investoren (Yield Seeking)
- II Bankenfinanzierung und –Regulierung (Bank net interest margin)
- III Attraktivität & Bedeutung der "Public Company" (Public market attractivity)
- IV Performance der Asset-Klasse (Performance chasing)
- V "Specialness"







https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-research-groups/tilburg-institute-private-debt, pascal.boeni@tilburguniversity.edu



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